Every Privileged Action

There is one call site for both precompiles: PqcAuth.requireSigned (contracts/src/pqc/PqcAuth.sol). It reads the signer's key with pqcKeyStatus, refuses an unregistered key, a key without proof of possession or a key of another algorithm than ML-DSA-87, then checks the signature with pqcVerify.

ActionSignerChecked inProtects
Oracle roundreporterDarwinOracle.submitevery price the baskets are valued at
RebalancecuratorDarwinBasket.rebalancethe exact trades the vault makes
Target weightscuratorDarwinBasket.setTargetWeightsthe basket's composition
16 admin functionsadminPqcAdmin._authorizeAdminevery power over the protocol and its funds
Test-token mintingadminDarwinTestToken.mintfQOR and fQWAKK supply
User trades and withdrawalsthe userDarwinAccount.execute (and the relayer first, with QoreSign)what the user's account does, call by call
Accounts' allowed targetsadminDarwinAccountFactory.setTarget (PqcAdmin)which contracts a user's account may call

The 16 admin functions: oracle addFeed, setTokenFeed, setReporter, setParams; reserve listToken, setSpread, setSpreadExempt, withdraw, setOracle; basket setMintPaused, setCurator, setGuardian, setReserve, setMaxRebalanceLoss, setOracle; and setAdmin on each. Each admin signature works once (nonce) and expires (deadline). The account factory adds a seventeenth, setTarget.

A user's Darwin account goes through the same PqcAuth.requireSigned, with the user's own registered key: it rebuilds the text QoreX signed (account, nonce, deadline, hash of the calls) and checks it before any call. See Darwin Accounts.

What a leaked secp256k1 key can do

Alone, nothing. Every transaction Darwin sends is a native MsgCrossVMCall hybrid-signed with secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87: the keeper's rounds and rebalances from the deployer, the relayers' account executions. None of these accounts holds an EVM window, so the chain refuses an ECDSA-only transaction from them ("has no open EVM authorisation window"), and opening a window needs the account's ML-DSA-87 key.

The deployer also holds the guardian role, which can only pause new mints, never selling or redeeming. The pause is the only function checked by msg.sender, so it too needs a hybrid transaction now. With both its keys the deployer still cannot change a price, a weight, a trade or a parameter, or move the reserve's funds: those need the reporter's, the curator's or the admin's ML-DSA-87 signature. No seed shares sit on it: every seed went to 0x...dEaD.

A contract creation and a call carrying QOR value still need an EVM transaction, because a cross-VM call can do neither. They are used at deployment only, through a window opened with the ML-DSA-87 key and closed afterwards.

Tested

Each row is covered by Foundry tests with mock precompiles and by the on-chain suite against the real pqcVerify and pqcKeyStatus: forged, tampered, replayed, stale and expired signatures refused. The suite also checks that no Darwin account holds an EVM window and that the chain refuses an ECDSA-only transaction from the deployer; ops/src/pq-audit.ts checks that every transaction of Darwin's accounts carries a verified hybrid signature. See Tests.