Hybrid Signing & Keys
Two signatures on every transaction
A QoreChain native transaction carries a secp256k1 signature and an ML-DSA-87 signature (FIPS 204) in a tx-body extension. The network requires the ML-DSA-87 layer. The chain records the check as pqc_hybrid_verify status=verified.
Registering a key
An account registers its ML-DSA-87 public key with MsgRegisterPQCKey, with a proof of possession. It is the one transaction allowed without the ML-DSA-87 layer. QoreX does this on its own with the account's first transaction; Darwin's roles were registered by ops/src/window.ts register.
The key is derived from the account's mnemonic and address, so it needs no separate backup.
Darwin's roles
| Role | Address | Key |
|---|---|---|
| Admin, guardian, fee recipient, keeper | 0x20807accBc9693B40a17F2EC73a07e6dc77d3f85 | eth_secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87; sends rounds and rebalances as hybrid MsgCrossVMCalls |
| Oracle reporter | 0x6A286f3D805c2bE0d653Ec86c1CaD9598373CB2e | ML-DSA-87 signs rounds |
| Curator | 0xe0BBCcb71b761041B3f3038b3E6cdb392CfbE373 | ML-DSA-87 signs weights and rebalances |
| Trade relayers (four) | qor1pzkqj8xadyhlqtpplps8jl5xmccf664s554wvf and three more | secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87; submit users' signed messages to the account factory as hybrid MsgCrossVMCalls, convert deposits and withdrawals |
All registered with proof of possession; PqcAuth refuses a key without it, and refuses a key whose algorithm is not ML-DSA-87 (algorithm id 1).
Every Darwin transaction is hybrid
| Sender | Transactions | Signed with |
|---|---|---|
| Keeper (deployer) | price rounds (memo darwin round <n>), rebalances (darwin rebalance <basket> <nonce>), admin calls | MsgCrossVMCall, secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87 |
| Relayers | account executions (darwin execute <account> <nonce> <calls hash, 12 hex>), deposit and withdrawal conversions | MsgCrossVMCall or MsgConvertCoin/MsgConvertERC20, secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87 |
| Guardian (deployer) | a pause of new mints | hybrid, like every other deployer transaction |
| Reporter, curator | none: they only sign messages | ML-DSA-87 |
None of these accounts holds an EVM window, so the chain refuses an ECDSA-only transaction from them (see EVM Windows). The QoreChain explorer shows each of their transactions "quantum-safe · verified on-chain": ML-DSA-87 (Dilithium-5), FIPS 204, NIST category 5. ops/src/pq-audit.ts checks it: 230/230 transactions since 2026-11-21T09:12Z, when the windows were closed.
Contract calls are sent by writeNative (app/src/server/chain.ts) in the app and write() (ops/src/evm.ts) in the ops scripts. Each call is simulated first from the role's 0x address, so a refusal is named before sending. A cross-VM call meters the EVM work at about 2.5x its EVM gas: the gas limit is max(1.2M, 2.8 x estimate + 400k), retried at x1.6 when out of gas. Only a contract creation and a call carrying QOR value still need an EVM transaction, at deployment only.
Inside the contracts
PqcAuth.requireSigned(account, message, signature) reads the account's key with pqcKeyStatus, refuses an unregistered key, a key without proof of possession or a key of another algorithm, then checks the signature with pqcVerify. Every privileged path in Darwin goes through it. See Every Privileged Action.
Signatures are domain-separated (tag, chain id, contract, nonce, deadline), and each contract exposes the exact bytes to sign (roundMessage, rebalanceMessage, weightsMessage, adminMessage), so off-chain signers never re-implement the encoding.
A user's trade is checked the same way: the user's Darwin account rebuilds the text QoreX signed and calls PqcAuth.requireSigned against the user's own registered key.