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hybrid-signing

Hybrid Signing & Keys

Two signatures on every transaction

A QoreChain native transaction carries a secp256k1 signature and an ML-DSA-87 signature (FIPS 204) in a tx-body extension. The network requires the ML-DSA-87 layer. The chain records the check as pqc_hybrid_verify status=verified.

Registering a key

An account registers its ML-DSA-87 public key with MsgRegisterPQCKey, with a proof of possession. It is the one transaction allowed without the ML-DSA-87 layer. QoreX does this on its own with the account's first transaction; Darwin's roles were registered by ops/src/window.ts register.

The key is derived from the account's mnemonic and address, so it needs no separate backup.

Darwin's roles

RoleAddressKey
Admin, guardian, fee recipient, keeper0x20807accBc9693B40a17F2EC73a07e6dc77d3f85eth_secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87; sends rounds and rebalances as hybrid MsgCrossVMCalls
Oracle reporter0x6A286f3D805c2bE0d653Ec86c1CaD9598373CB2eML-DSA-87 signs rounds
Curator0xe0BBCcb71b761041B3f3038b3E6cdb392CfbE373ML-DSA-87 signs weights and rebalances
Trade relayers (four)qor1pzkqj8xadyhlqtpplps8jl5xmccf664s554wvf and three moresecp256k1 + ML-DSA-87; submit users' signed messages to the account factory as hybrid MsgCrossVMCalls, convert deposits and withdrawals

All registered with proof of possession; PqcAuth refuses a key without it, and refuses a key whose algorithm is not ML-DSA-87 (algorithm id 1).

Every Darwin transaction is hybrid

SenderTransactionsSigned with
Keeper (deployer)price rounds (memo darwin round <n>), rebalances (darwin rebalance <basket> <nonce>), admin callsMsgCrossVMCall, secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87
Relayersaccount executions (darwin execute <account> <nonce> <calls hash, 12 hex>), deposit and withdrawal conversionsMsgCrossVMCall or MsgConvertCoin/MsgConvertERC20, secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87
Guardian (deployer)a pause of new mintshybrid, like every other deployer transaction
Reporter, curatornone: they only sign messagesML-DSA-87

None of these accounts holds an EVM window, so the chain refuses an ECDSA-only transaction from them (see EVM Windows). The QoreChain explorer shows each of their transactions "quantum-safe · verified on-chain": ML-DSA-87 (Dilithium-5), FIPS 204, NIST category 5. ops/src/pq-audit.ts checks it: 230/230 transactions since 2026-11-21T09:12Z, when the windows were closed.

Contract calls are sent by writeNative (app/src/server/chain.ts) in the app and write() (ops/src/evm.ts) in the ops scripts. Each call is simulated first from the role's 0x address, so a refusal is named before sending. A cross-VM call meters the EVM work at about 2.5x its EVM gas: the gas limit is max(1.2M, 2.8 x estimate + 400k), retried at x1.6 when out of gas. Only a contract creation and a call carrying QOR value still need an EVM transaction, at deployment only.

Inside the contracts

PqcAuth.requireSigned(account, message, signature) reads the account's key with pqcKeyStatus, refuses an unregistered key, a key without proof of possession or a key of another algorithm, then checks the signature with pqcVerify. Every privileged path in Darwin goes through it. See Every Privileged Action.

Signatures are domain-separated (tag, chain id, contract, nonce, deadline), and each contract exposes the exact bytes to sign (roundMessage, rebalanceMessage, weightsMessage, adminMessage), so off-chain signers never re-implement the encoding.

A user's trade is checked the same way: the user's Darwin account rebuilds the text QoreX signed and calls PqcAuth.requireSigned against the user's own registered key.