Risks
Darwin on QoreChain is a testnet deployment. This page lists what can go wrong and what bounds it.
Testnet
The tokens have no value and the network is a testnet: it can be reset, upgraded or paused by its operators. Nothing here is an offer of a financial product.
The relayer
A QoreX user trades through a Darwin account; Darwin's relayer submits the user's signed messages and pays the gas (see QoreX & the Relayer).
- What it cannot do. Change a call (the signature fails on chain), replay a message (the nonce moved), or make an account call a contract outside Darwin's router, baskets and fUSD. The list of allowed targets changes only with the admin's ML-DSA-87 signature.
- Deposits and withdrawals. The fUSD passes through the relayer for one transaction each way: the user's
MsgSendto the relayer, converted onto the account; or the account's transfer to the relayer, converted back to the user's wallet. A custody of seconds. Each deposit is credited once (the relayer's memo, read back from the chain), and a withdrawal cut halfway is completed bysettleWithdrawals()before the next withdrawal and in the daily cron. - What it can do. Refuse or delay a message. Nothing moves without one.
- If it stops. Trades from QoreX stop, and fUSD cannot be converted back to bank form through Darwin. Holdings do not: the account accepts signed messages from any submitter, and redeeming in kind is permissionless.
- Shares bought before Darwin accounts. Selling them uses the original path: for the 24 hours of a grant, the relayer may send
MsgCrossVMCallandMsgConvertCoinas the user. It acts only on intents whose signatures verify against the user's on-chain key, each used once and expiring within 10 minutes; the chain admits its EVM calls only through the user's own EVM window; the grant expires on its own and can be revoked.
The oracle
A signature proves who published a price, not that it is right.
- Inputs. BTC and ETH: median of four spot APIs. QOR: median of CoinGecko and MEXC (its only real market is MEXC); without two of its three quotes, QOR and QWAKK sit out the round. QWAKK: its only market is a thin pool, so the oracle uses that pool's 30-minute median, not its spot.
- Bounds. A round can move a price at most 15%; rounds are at least 60 seconds apart; a feed appears at most once per round; readers refuse prices older than 30 minutes.
- If rounds stop. Buying and selling through the router stop once prices are stale. Redeeming in kind does not need a price.
The reserve
The reserve trades at the oracle's price with a 0.30% spread. It holds a finite inventory: a buy above what it holds of a component is refused before signing. Arbitrage around price updates is possible within that spread; on testnet this is accepted.
QOR and QWAKK are stand-ins
Qore Ecosystem and Degen first held WQOR (wrapped native QOR) and real QWAKK, bought on QoreChain's native AMM in swaps under its 5% price-impact cap. At QOR's market price a faucet claim is worth about $0.33 and QWAKK's whole market about $330, which capped those baskets at about $66 and $36 a buy. Holding more would have meant pumping a community token's only pool, which is also the pool the oracle reads.
So they hold fQOR and fQWAKK: Darwin test tokens priced by the same QOR and QWAKK feeds, minted only by the admin's ML-DSA-87 signature. The real QOR and QWAKK went back to the public pools. Their earlier versions are paused for new buys; their holders can always redeem in kind.
Keys
A secp256k1 key of Darwin's alone can send nothing. Every Darwin transaction is a native MsgCrossVMCall hybrid-signed with secp256k1 + ML-DSA-87, and none of Darwin's accounts holds an EVM window, so the chain refuses an ECDSA-only transaction from them. The deployer holds the guardian role, which can only pause new mints; that pause too now needs a hybrid transaction. With both its keys, the deployer still cannot change a price, a weight, a trade or a parameter, or move the reserve's funds. A relayer, with both its keys, can submit to the account factory, where every call needs the owner's ML-DSA-87 signature.
Known limitations
See Known Limitations for what the review of 2026-11-20 found and what changed.